Abstract
This study analyzes the possibility that COVID-19 will increase the risk of a military conflict between the United States and People’s Republic of China. The mechanism is that COVID-19 weakens American economic output, which undermines the U.S. capability to project force. This enables China’s efforts to revise the status quo. Although a rapid collapse of American power due to COVID-19 would theoretically increase the likelihood of an armed conflict, this scenario is unlikely due to the centrality of the U.S. dollar in the global financial system. I therefore argue that COVID-19 increases the short term risk of military crises, particularly in the South China Sea and Persian Gulf, but does not significantly increase the likelihood of a power transition and full scale war. However, the long term depends on the ability of the U.S. to respond adequately to the COVID-19 crisis.
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