Federal Dimensions of India's Response to the COVID Pandemic: Refuting the 'Flailing State'

17 Pages Posted: 1 Nov 2022

See all articles by Nirvikar Singh

Nirvikar Singh

University of California, Santa Cruz

Date Written: October 28, 2022

Abstract

This paper examines India’s responses to the Covid-19 pandemic, from the perspective of its federal structures. It first summarizes different institutional components of India’s federal system. Next, it outlines the responses to the pandemic, both over time, and across different levels of government. The main contribution of the paper is a new evaluation of the federal dimensions of India’s governmental responses at different levels. It is argued that, while the national government did well in some respects, and there was considerable coordination across levels of government, there were key failures, both in the manner of the initial abrupt and drastic national lockdown in March 2020, and in the lack of preparation and national response to the deadlier second wave of the pandemic in 2021. By contrast, subnational governments, both state and local, and including bureaucrats and elected officials, did better than might have been expected, especially in the face of limited resources and information. It is argued that India’s pandemic experience contradicts the “flailing state” idea that was devised to explain the country’s governmental performance in recent decades. The paper also questions the applicability of the concept of “cooperative federalism” to the Indian case. It argues that India’s federal system proved quite resilient, but can be made more effective by strengthening capacity at the local level.

Keywords: Federalism, Covid-19, coronavirus, pandemic, India, centralization

JEL Classification: H1, H77, I18, P00

Suggested Citation

Singh, Nirvikar, Federal Dimensions of India's Response to the COVID Pandemic: Refuting the 'Flailing State' (October 28, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4262527 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4262527

Nirvikar Singh (Contact Author)

University of California, Santa Cruz ( email )

Department of Economics
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