Pandemic Lending: The Unintended Effects of Model-based Regulation

40 Pages Posted: 4 Feb 2022

See all articles by Franco Fiordelisi

Franco Fiordelisi

University of Essex - Essex Business School

GIULIA fusi

University of Nottingham

Angela Maddaloni

European Central Bank (ECB)

David Marques-Ibanez

European Central Bank (ECB)

Date Written: November 12, 2021

Abstract

Does model-based bank regulation constrain lending when it matters the most? Using an extensive loan-level supervisory dataset on credit exposures of Euro Area banks, we document that during the Covid-19 pandemic, banks using their own (internal-rating based or IRB) models to measure credit risk, decreased their on-balance sheet credit exposures, especially lending, to Non-Financial Corporations more than banks using standard ( fixed risk-weights) models to the same borrower. Lower capitalized IRB banks reduced their exposures more towards borrowers absorbing more regulatory capital and borrowers in the economic sectors most affected by the pandemic.

Keywords: Banks, Supervision, Lending, Credit Rationing

JEL Classification: G21, G28

Suggested Citation

Fiordelisi, Franco and fusi, GIULIA and Maddaloni, Angela and Marques-Ibanez, David, Pandemic Lending: The Unintended Effects of Model-based Regulation (November 12, 2021). Proceedings of Paris December 2021 Finance Meeting EUROFIDAI - ESSEC, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4025463 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4025463

Franco Fiordelisi (Contact Author)

University of Essex - Essex Business School ( email )

Wivenhoe Park
Colchester, CO4 3SQ
United Kingdom

GIULIA Fusi

University of Nottingham ( email )

University Park
Nottingham, NG8 1BB
United Kingdom

Angela Maddaloni

European Central Bank (ECB) ( email )

Sonnemannstrasse 22
Frankfurt am Main, 60314
Germany

David Marques-Ibanez

European Central Bank (ECB) ( email )

Sonnemannstrasse 22
Frankfurt am Main, 60314
Germany
49 6913 44 6460 (Phone)
49 6913 44 6460 (Fax)

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