Public procurement and corruption during Covid-19: self-monitoring and whistleblowing incentives after Srebrena Malina

Fabian Teichmann; Marie-Christin Falker

doi:10.5771/1435-2869-2021-2-181

Contents
- Chapter Expand | CollapseAuthorsPage
- I–II Titelei/Inhaltsverzeichnis I–II
- 157–158 Editorial 157–158
- 159–166 Effects of the Covid-19 pandemic on labour markets in the western Balkans Azemina Mashovic, Tatjana Dragičević Radičević Azemina Mashovic, Tatjana Dragičević Radičević 159–166
- 167–180 Covid-19: the most common occupational disease in 2020 in the Republic of Croatia Ivana Krišto, Cvetan Kovač, Ana Šijaković Ivana Krišto, Cvetan Kovač, Ana Šijaković 167–180
- 181–206 Public procurement and corruption during Covid-19: self-monitoring and whistleblowing incentives after Srebrena Malina Fabian Teichmann, Marie-Christin Falker Fabian Teichmann, Marie-Christin Falker 181–206
- 207–218 Facing democratic indeterminacy: the consequences of the Dayton Agreement Christophe Solioz Christophe Solioz 207–218
- 219–242 Domestic elite support for reforms in transition economies: the case of North Macedonia Viktorija Mano Viktorija Mano 219–242
- 243–264 Tackling the informal economy in Moldova: An assessment of the options Martin Hutsebaut Martin Hutsebaut 243–264
- 265–284 Hungary and its civil society organisations – a fateful example for south-east Europe? Melanie Hien Melanie Hien 265–284
- 285–286 About the Authors 285–286
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SEER Journal for Labour and Social Affairs in Eastern Europe , page 181 - 206

Public procurement and corruption during Covid-19: self-monitoring and whistleblowing incentives after Srebrena Malina

Autoren

Fabian Teichmann Marie-Christin Falker

DOI
- doi.org/10.5771/1435-2869-2021-2-181
- ISSN: 1435-2869
- ISSN online: 2942-3384
Abstract

Crises and emergencies tend to increase opportunities for corruption in public procurement. This article shows how the Covid-19 pandemic has given rise to new corruption opportunities and how regulators are trying to combat these, using the example of the case of the Bosnian raspberry firm Srebrena Malina. The literature review concludes that prevention mechanisms focus on the legal and regulatory aspects without considering firms’ perspectives. In contrast, an approach based on summary content analysis may help firms develop potential self-monitoring solutions that they can apply to ensure compliance with anti-corruption regulations and avoid sanctions. Explorative expert interviews with ten international compliance experts are also conducted. The findings illustrate that whistleblowing incentives could foster compliance with existing regulations and policies in public procurement. This article advocates a more consequential implementation of the current anti-corruption and public procurement regulations alongside self-monitoring measures in the form of whistleblowing incentives.
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