When the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic started to manifest itself across the globe at an unprecedented pace and magnitude, the various emergency response strategies pursued by highly affected countries in Europe raised many questions about their supposed effectiveness. To contain the outbreak, a rapid and adequate emergency response was vital to control emergent public health risks, but emergency management was challenged by large uncertainty due to many unknowns about crucial determinants of the outbreak, determining the effectiveness of the response, which was often derived from uncertain information. This paper aims to draw lessons from the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic and it presents a review of strategies for emergency response pursued in eight European countries, including tipping points that triggered strategy shifts in emergency response. The paper shows that: (i) these countries have a culturally determined preference for policy response style (Mediterranean, continental and liberal style) depending on their relative scores on power distance and uncertainty avoidance, which (ii) is reflected in the initially adopted control paradigm and the associated strategy; (iii) Mediterranean countries (Italy, France, Spain) with high levels of power distance and uncertainty avoidance have a tendency to respond to new unknown situations by deploying strong rule-based regulatory systems which offer mental security and social order, whereas continental (Germany and Austria) and liberal countries (the Netherlands, the UK and Sweden) do this to medium and much lower extents.

Aim: This paper reflects on the COVID-19 epidemic from the perspective of small probabilities and the difficulty of predicting similar events. Against the background of basic economic principles, the importance of the precautionary principle for crisis management is discussed, as well as potential consequences of this epidemic. Findings: The authors argue that whilst the epidemic as such was unexpected, in future countries should be prepared for such stochastic events to happen. This requires a precautionary approach. When society is not prepared for such a calamity, or waits too long to implement measures to deal with it, the social and economic costs may be very high – much higher than ‘hedging bets’ and losing. The article reflects on different issues which are meant for further discussion on unpredictable future threats. One important issue is the uncertainty created by this event. This increases the likeliness that something unexpected can appear in the near future, creating ...

Crises have become inevitable for organizations operating in a fast and constantly changing environment due to uncertainties and sudden occurring dangers (Sonmez & Backman, 1992: 30). Crises that may develop at any time and in any circumstances have been and will be a part of life as situations to be dealt with, whether they are human- induced or originate from natural causes. Crises can occur on a scale ranging from local to global and are synonymous with an event that disrupts the pre- existing situation (Laws et al., 2007: 6). Although there is no universally accepted definition of what constitutes a crisis, the comments of different authors appear in the studies. According to Henderson (2007), a triggering event that causes a significant change or has the potential to cause a significant change, “the perception of not being able to cope with this change and a threat to the foundation of the organization” usually corresponds to the crisis (Henderson, 2007: 3). The tourism industry, which serves in constant interaction and communication with people, has a highly vulnerable structure against internal or external shocks such as natural disasters, pandemics, terrorist attacks, economic bottlenecks, and political conflicts (Yozcu & Cetin, 2019: 273). Again, health hazards arising from participation in tourism can cause crisis in tourism and these need to be addressed at national, international, industrial, and institutional level. Moreover, health plays a key role in visitor satisfaction in the tourism industry, as environments that may pose health risks affect the preferences of individuals (Henderson, 2007: 104– 105). Regarding this point of view, with the COVID- 19 pandemic affecting the whole world, crisis management has become particularly important in the tourism industry as in all other industries. The purpose of this study is to evaluate the crisis management phenomenon during the pandemic in terms of the Tourism industry. For this purpose, the crisis, types of crisis, crisis management, crisis and management in the tourism industry, factors causing crisis in the tourism industry, the COVID- 19 pandemic and its reflections on the tourism industry were explained with the literature review method, and later, the cases were evaluated in the context of the COVID- 19 pandemic.

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to show that 2009 H1N1 " swine " influenza pandemic vaccination policies deviated from predictions established in the theory of political survival, and to propose that pandemic response deviated because it was ruled by bureaucratized experts rather than by elected politicians. Design/methodology/approach – Focussing on the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, the paper employs descriptive statistical analysis of vaccination policies in nine western democracies. To probe the plausibility of the novel explanation, it uses quantitative and qualitative content analyses of media attention and coverage in two deviant cases, the USA and Denmark. Findings – Theories linking political survival to disaster responses find little empirical support in the substantial crosscountry variations of vaccination responses during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic. Rather than following a political logic, the case studies of media coverage in the USA and Denmark demonstrate that the response was bureaucratized in the public health agencies (CDC and DMHA, respectively). Hence, while natural disaster responses appear to follow a political logic, the response to pandemics appears to be more strongly instituted in the hands of bureaucratic experts. Research limitations/implications – There is an added value of encompassing bureaucratic dynamics in political theories of disaster response; bureaucratized expertise proved to constitute a strong plausible explanation of the 2009 pandemic vaccination response. Practical implications – Pandemic preparedness and response depends critically on understanding the lessons of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic; a key lesson supported by this paper is that expert-based agencies rather than political leaders are the pivotal actors. Originality/value – This paper is the first to pinpoint the limitations of political survival theories of disaster responses with respect to the 2009 pandemic. Further, it is among the few to analyze the causes of variations in crosscountry pandemic vaccination policies during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic.

This study examines the level of preparedness exhibited through strategy, planning and organization to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic in Italy. A comparative analysis of four regions revealed that the implementation of pandemic plans was affected by multiple factors. For instance, some planning was outdated and insufficient to cope with the new threat posed by the pandemic; due to a decentralized health care system, there was confusion about whether regional or national decision-making was the coordinating actor; shortages in supplies and equipment such as masks, in some regions, were due to lack of implementation of existing pandemic plans. The study emphasizes the importance of a coordinated response to crises.

The Covid-19 pandemic has been analysed and discussed from many disciplinary perspectives. An aspect that still needs critical exploration is the role-that is, the modes and forms-of regulatory interventions during the pandemic. It is interesting to note in this regard that, in many studies, regulatory measures are labelled "non-pharmaceutical interventions", as if they do not have any specificity on their own and only represent a theoretically residual category. The main aim of this article is instead to focus on the distinctive features of normative measures as such. As regards the article's focus, it centres on the normative interventions in the first period of the pandemic-that is, 2020-with particular reference to Italy. We have chosen to focus on this period because the most extensive and severe restrictions introduced to combat Covid-19 were established at that time. And we have chosen to consider Italy because it was the first country, after China, to be hard hit by the virus and to react in a draconian manner. As regards the methodology, the article is based, in general and primarily, on an extensive interdisciplinary literature review. With reference to the Italian case, the study is additionally based on: first-hand data collection and analysis (especially concerning Italian normative measures mainly issued at the national level: their type, frequency, target, hierarchical relationships); secondhand data and analysis (for instance as regards the effectiveness of Italy's and other countries' regulatory measures). In discussing the Italian response to the Covid-19 pandemic, certain weaknesses have been identified; and possible lessons have been highlighted, in terms of both "planning" (i.e. the necessity to better pre-define concrete and circumscribed sets of actions) and of "meta-planning" (i.e. the necessity of better planning the way in which public authorities could and should plan and act). Although this article is mainly based on the Italian situation, what we can learn from this case is largely generalizable.

With the Covid-19 pandemic dominating the agenda, it seems almostnatural that it be associated with another buzzword: populism. As thepandemic advances, it seems that the prediction of populism surviving thepandemic due to its own diversity has been proved right, given thevariation in responses by populists around the world. One commondenominator stands out though: populists across the political spectrumunderstood the benefits of performing the Covid-19 crisis as a tool tostrengthen their political positions. They tried to politicize the pandemic toincrease the antagonism between the people and the elites. In this article, Iintroduce the notion of crisis as both a construct and a performance, and asa useful concept to analyze populist reactions to the pandemic. I argue thatnotwithstanding the attempts to politicize the pandemic, the Covid-19 crisisended up imposing its own reality. In other words: the crisis could not beowned by politics.

Like many Western European countries, Belgium and the Netherlands have been strongly hit by COVID-19. Almost simultaneously, the virus spread, caused a relatively high number of infections and severe lockdown measures were imposed; however, at the same time, the crisis management response has been sufficiently different to justify a systematic comparative analysis. We start with the premise that decisions made on the basis of incomplete information show the true nature of governments’ response to a crisis, which is conditioned by legacies arising from the past and organizational cultures, existing and new governance structures, and strategies used by specific actors. We show that the difference in crisis management echoes the countries’ different types of consociationalism, though also that Belgian federalism and Dutch decentralism impeded a truly coherent response. The cost of coordinating different government levels made a uniform approach difficult too. Actor strategies attemptin...